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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that physical characteristics such as obesity
can result in a salary gap in the work place. It is, however, not clear how much
of this (gap) is due to factors emanating from the demand or supply side of the
market. In this paper we use a field experiment to study whether a part of this
wage gap can be attributed to personality traits of individuals on the supply
side. Monitors randomly select individuals to respond to a questionnaire.
Individuals can make money requests for completing the questionnaire. In
the questionnaire they also self-report several personality chracteristics. We
find that the more obese individuals perceive themselves to be, lesser is the
money they request. The negative association between money requests and
obesity is mostly driven by female participants. The effect of (self-perceived)
non-obese individuals is asymmetric across gender. Self perceived ”normal”
females, perceived thin by the monitors, request more, meanwhile, males in this
category request less relative to those that do not overstate their obesity levels.
Our results suggest that lower salary request may anchor obese individuals to
lower thresholds and may partly explain the wage gap.
Keywords: Self-reported obesity, field experiments, willingness to accept,
gender bias.
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1 Introduction
Individuals suffering from obesity face prejudice and discrimination in their daily
social interactions (See Puhl and Heuer 2009, for an extensive review). Numerous
empirical studies have reported the negative effects of obesity, measured by body
mass index on wages and employment rates (Cawley 2004, Cawley and Danziger
2005, Garcia and Quintana-Domeque 2006, Cawley 2007, Brunello and D’Hombres
2007, Han, Norton and Stearns 2009).1 Further, although weaker this result still
holds when more complex measures of obesity are employed (Burkhauser and Cawley
2008, Johansson et al. 2009, Wada and Tekin 2010).2
Evidence on discrimination attributed to obesity can also be found in experi-
mental psychology studies. In a meta-analysis on weight discrimination (Roehling
et al. 2008) it was demonstrated that overweight job applicants and employees were
evaluated more negatively and had more negative employment outcomes compared
to non-overweight counterparts.3
Note that, all aforementioned studies have looked at the demand side of the
labor market, little is known about the behavior of employees who represent the
supply side. There may be other individual factors arising from the supply side that
could also be playing a role in determining the final wage. For example, the labour
market has a well known feature where employers can elicit a prospective employees
willingness to accept for the job in question. These wage proposals from prospective
employees could very well work as an anchor for wage determination especially if
they are below an employers wage threshold. This could be thus another channel
that reinforces the wage discrimination in the workplace as such individuals would
1Cawley (2004) finds that for white females, an increase of 64 pounds above average weight was
associated with a 9% decrease in wages. Han, Norton and Stearns (2009) find that the negative
relationship between the BMI and wages is larger in occupations requiring social interactions and
for older people. Brunello and D’Hombres (2007) observe that a 10% increase in the average
BMI reduces the hourly wages of males by 1.9% and females by 3.3% while Garcia and Quintana-
Domeque (2006) find a negative correlation between wages and obesity, ranging from -2 to -10%
only for women.
2Burkhauser and Cawley (2008) claim that total body fat is negatively correlated with employ-
ment for some groups. Johansson et al. (2009) find that only waist circumference has a negative
association with wages for women. Wada and Tekin (2010) report that body fat is associated with
decreased wages for both males and females while they also present evidence suggesting that free
fat mass is associated with increased wages.
3Studies included in the analysis were those using simulated employment decisions and demon-
strated an effect between target weight and job-related outcome variables. Out-come variables
included hiring recommendations, qualification/suitability ratings, disciplinary decisions, salary as-
signments, placement decisions, and coworker ratings.
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start from a lower wage. Initial requests, or initial offers, are important because they
can serve as anchors in the negotiation process and influence subsequent offers. The
importance of the adjustment from an anchor in making judgments under uncertainty
was first described by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Further, several empirical
and experimental studies in the negotiation-bargaining literature have confirmed its
importance (Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001, Ritov 1996).
While elicitating wage proposals may result in lower wage anchors. Another
important issue is self-perception, or self esteem. If ones self esteem is lower then
this may be another channel that pushes their requests down. This then implies that
the willigness to accept from these individuals may be further lowered.
Socio-psychologists have highlighted the negative relationship between self es-
teem and obesity. In a nationally representative study of over 3000 adults, (Carr
and Friedman 2005) find that obese individuals report lower levels of self-acceptance
than normal-weight persons, which is fully mediated by perceptions of weight dis-
crimination. Further, (Biro et al. 2006) report that BMI is an important predictor of
self-esteem on a 2379 sample of 9 and 10 years old girls. Meanwhile, (Hesketh, Wake
and Waters 2004) find that obesity/overweight precedes low self-esteem in a study of
1157 elementary school children in Australia.4 Obese people are more vulnerable to
lower self-esteem which, in turn, is correlated with lower initial wage requests and,
by extension, with lower earnings.
Given this we run experiments where we elicit wage proposals for filling out a
questionnaire. All experiments were conducted by interviewers who were trained for
the task. Subjects were asked to fill out a questionnaire. They were then asked as
to how much money they would like to request as compensation for the effort they
made and for the information they provided. Note that this is an open-ended question
(Greig 2008) and reflects a situation where the employer elicits a willigness-to-accept
value from prospective employees.
Subjects also answered other questions on personal and physical characteristics
on a 7 scale Likert question. One of the questions was regarding their own per-
ceived obesity level. In this manner we obtained information about an individuals
perceived obesity. This question is relevant to what we are interested in, i.e. how
does self perception affect the revealed willingness to accept for completing the ques-
tionnaire? Whether someone self discriminates, in terms of a lower wage proposal,
will be reflected through this question. Though obtaining information on ones own
perception is important, it is equally important to obtain information regarding the
perception of others. We control for this and asked the monitors to document how
4In the same direction, but more moderated, are the results of the two comprehensive reviews of
self-esteem and obesity in youths by French, Story and Perry (1995) and Wardle and Cooke (2005).
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they perceived the individual they were interviewing.
Finally, we also check for differences in wage proposals based upon gender. Sev-
eral studies (Rosenbaum 1984, Gerhart 1990, Barron 2003, Greig 2008) demonstrate
that men make significantly larger salary requests than women. This then leads to a
lower first salary and consequently to a more modest career advancement. According
to this literature, differences in men’s and women’s entitlement are due to several
factors: group-based social inequities, intra-group and intra-personal comparison bi-
ases, group differences in reference standards (Major 1994), socialization pressure
(Wade 2001), effectiveness in competitive environments (Gneezy, Niederle and Rus-
tichini 2003). However, how physical characteristics such as obesity may contribute
to self discrimination has not been studied so far.5
Self fulfilling prophecy theory (Merton 1948) on the working environment argues
that employers6 who form false general beliefs for obese employees7, develop differ-
ential treatment towards their obese employees who eventually shape their behavior
in an expectancy-consistent manner. Expecting lower wages, obese workers request,
or they are willing to accept, lower wages. The same conclusion is also supported by
the statistical discrimination theory as explained in (Piketty 1998).
The main focus of this experimental study can be stated through the following
questions: Do obese individuals, i.e., who self-report a higher-than median level of
obesity, request less money than non-obese people? Secondly, does the interaction
between obesity and gender have any significant effect on money requests? Finally,
are there gender differences in self discrimination?
The study is organized as follows: the experimental methods are described in
section 2, while the data and results are presented in section 3 and 4, respectively.
In section 5, we make a comparison between self and monitor reported data on
obesity. Finally, section 6 concludes with a discussion of the results.
5Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) is a close experimental paper that focus on ”beauty”. They
decompose the beauty premium in an experimental labor market where employers determine wages
of workers who perform a maze-solving task.
6Wang, Brownell and Wadden (2004) provide evidence that obese people, unlike other minority
groups, appear to hold negative attitudes toward in-group members (weight bias internalization),
no distinction between obese and non-obese employers is necessary to be made.
7Research to date (see Puhl and Heuer 2009 for an extensive review) suggests that the most
common stereotypes about obese employees include views that they are less hard-working, less
perseverant, less conscientious, less agreeable, less emotionally stable, less extraverted etc. than
their normal-weight counterparts. Nevertheless, it is also true that obesity is related to less self-
control and health problems, two aspects which have negative impact on work outcomes.
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2 Experimental methods
We conduct an economic field experiment with 270 subjects from different socioeco-
nomic backgrounds. Twenty seven mediators-interviewers aged between 20-60 years
and from varying socioeconomic backgrounds were recruited to help us (an media-
tors) to conduct the experiment. All of them were students at the School of Social
Work at the Universidad of Granada taking a module on ”Economic Analysis of
Social Work”. None of them had any past experience in economic experiments.
2.1 Stage 1: Mediators’ Training
Mediators were trained for a total of six hours. Training included a general descrip-
tion of experimental methods with special reference to the experimental protocols.
Additional instructions regarding the experiment were also given in detail. Each me-
diator was asked to independently recruit 10 subjects to participate in an economic
experiment within one week’s time. The interviewers had no information about the
research focus of the study (before or after). By doing so it was ensured that subjects
were not selected on the basis of any specific characteristic that were of interest to
the experimenters.
The interviewers were also told that employed subjects were preferred and that
they should aim for a balanced subject pool (based on gender). This was done as
we were interesting in eliciting valuations from individuals who were in a workplace
environment. After the first week, the mediators were asked to submit a list with
the (codified) names of the ten subjects they had recruited.
2.2 Stage 2: Questionnaires and Implementation
In the second stage, every monitor answered a questionnaire (Qj) describing the
j−subjects she had recruited (j = 10 subjects). The questionnaire consisted of
two parts: Q(a)j appearance and personality questions about j; Q(b)j Sally-Ann
task (Wimmer and Perner 1983). They were also asked to describe the relationship
between herself and the j−subject.
After completing and submitting the questionnaire to the researchers, the mon-
itors received ten questionnaires (Qj) and ten envelopes. These envelopes were de-
livered by them to their j−subjects for enclosing their private answers.
Questionnaires Q(.)j and Q(.)
j were identical. The only difference is that the
questions in Q(.)j were answered by each of the interviewer (describing the j−participants)
while the questions in Q(.)j were self-reported by each of the j−subjects.
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Since the b block was only used to distract participants (and interviewers) from
the main goal of the research, we will focus now on the a block. It consisted of
four questions about their appearance, namely obesity, beauty, height and manner
of dress, and five questions about their personality characteristics, such as ambition,
self-esteem, sociality, creativeness and benevolence.
All these questions are ranked on a 7-level Likert scale. Obesity is used as an
explanatory variable while beauty, ambition and self − esteem are used as control
variables. The remaining questions were not related with the experiment but used
to distract subjects (as we did with the Sally-Ann task).
At the end of the questionnaire participants were also asked regarding how much
money they would like to receive for the task. Specifically, subjects were asked the
following question: How much money you would like to request as a compensation for
the effort you made to fill out the questionnaire and for the information you provided
us.
We were thinking on alternative modes of elicititation like asking subjects to select
between, for instance, 0 - 5 – 10 – 15 – 20 euros. However this would definitively
anchor our participant’s choices. Moreover, we felt that our open–ended question
is suitable for the purpose of our experiment. That is, we did not want to ”frame”
subject elicitations. In fact, asking for an infinite amount is optimal in this ”game”,
since this always ensures that they receive the highest quantity. It is due to this
reason that the extreme values we obtain are of interest to us.
It was also clarified that the money available for the research project was pro-
vided by the Spanish government and did not belong to either the mediators or the
researchers. Subjects were also asked to give their names and home addresses for
receiving the money that would be paid to them. Participants were also assured
about their personal data protection in agreement with the Spanish Law 15/1999.
2.3 Payments
Payments were made two weeks later according to the following rule: Subjects who
requested 10 euros or more, were paid 10 euros. All the rest received the exact amount
of their request. Table 1 summarizes relevant information for payments. Rows show
the number of people not answering (n.a), requesting 0 euro, or a positive amount of
money (> 0) while the columns indicate whether subjects provide no-info, incomplete
or complete personal information.
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Table 1
Personal Information and Money Requests
no-info incomplete complete Total
Requests
n.a. 17 5 1 23
0e 53 21 19 93
>0e 2 45 107 154
Total 72 71 127 270
There were 72 subjects who requested 0 euros, gave no answer, or did not give
their personal information. Among the 154 individuals who asked for a positive
amount of money two provided no personal data at all while 45 of them provided
incomplete data. From the sample of 107 subjects who both provide all the necessary
personal data and ask for a positive amount of money, there was a fraction of subjects
(16%) who did not provide the mediators with a photocopy of their ID for complet-
ing the payment (required under Spanish tax regulation). Finally, the 89 subjects
who asked for a positive amount of money, gave complete personal information and
provided copies of their ID were paid.
2.4 Ethical concerns
All participants were assured that that their anonymity will always be preserved (in
agreement with the Spanish Law 15/1999 for Personal Data Protection). Subjects
were informed that no association will ever be made between subjects’ real names,
the corresponding codes and the final results. All experimental procedures were
checked and approved by the Vice-Dean of Research of the School of Economics at
the University of Granada, the institution coordinating the experiment.
3 Data considerations
In most cases the variables used in our analysis are generated from the raw data
obtained directly from the experiments. However, it was necessary to transform the
initial raw variable in the case of (the dependent variable) money.
3.1 Dependent Variable: Money
The dependent variable under consideration is the amount of money that subjects
requested in compensation for the effort they made to fill out the particular ques-
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tionnaire. We see that the empirical distribution of the variable is not continuous.
Our participants requested money (if any) in a very heterogenous way:
• 93 subjects (34%) requested 0 euros, meanwhile, 23 did not answer how much
they will be willingness to accept to complete the questionnaire.
• Among those who requested a positive amount of money, 4.46% of them re-
quested more than 250 euros.
• Further, there are several focal points (apart from 0) such as 10, 20, 30, 50,100
which have frequencies of more than 5% each.
Sice we have several people asking nothing, others asking a large amount and a
number of focal points (10, 20, 30, 50 and 100 euros; frequencies > 5% each) we
decice to generate an ordinal variable around these points. The 6 ordered categories
variable is generated as follows:
Table 2
Dependent Variable: Money
label 0 1 2 3 4 5
categories 0 1− 15 16− 30 50− 70 90− 100 > 149
n 116 39 46 28 17 24
In the regression analysis done in the next section, the dependent variable money
is represented in two different ways.
money(.) is a 6-category ordinal variable which includes all the observations exactly as
described above (Table 2). This variable attempts to shed light on the question:
Who requests more money?”
money(1/0) is a dichotomous variable. The first category includes the 116 subjects who
requested 0 euros, while the second category, which is an aggregation of cat-
egories 1-5 of the variable money, includes the 154 persons who requested a
positive amount of money. In this case the question under examination is:
Who requests money and who does not?”
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3.2 Independent Variables
Recall that the objective of this study is to see how subjects perceive themselves and
whether it affects their willingness-to-accept. Given this we use self-reported obesity
instead of any objective measurement like BMI. We will discuss this issue at the end
of the section.
The variable obese, an ordinal self-reported explanatory variable describing the
level of subjects’ obesity (from 1=very thin to 7=very obese), is not easy to interpret.
Values of the variable (1, 2, ..., 7) are not ranked directly. Perceiving that one is
very thin does not necessarily imply that one is more attractive relative to someone
who feels obese. Due to this reason two dummy variables were generated from the
original variable using obese = 4 as the reference point8:
dobese a dummy variable taking value 1 if the subject reports level 5, 6 or 7 in the
question on obesity and 0 otherwise,
dthin a dummy variable taking value 1 if the subject reports level 1, 2 or 3 in the
question on obesity and 0 otherwise.
Miller and Downey (1999) conclude in their meta-analysis that heavy people
have low self-esteem. Additionally, the relation is stronger for people who perceive
themselves as heavy (than for people who actually are) and are thus likely to be
perceived as heavy by others. To control for possible con-founding effects we use the
following independent variables:
beauty an ordinal self-reported explanatory variable describing the level of subjects’
beauty (from 1(very ugly) - 7 (very beautiful)).
ambition an ordinal self-reported control variable describing the level of subjects’ ambi-
tion (from 1(not ambitious at all) - 7 (very ambitious)).
self − est. an ordinal self-reported control variable describing the level of subjects’ self-
esteem (from 1(no self-esteem at all) - 7 (high self-esteem)).
Recall that we also ask the mediators to report on subject characteristics. The
following variables are incorporated from their responses:
female a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the subject is female and 0 otherwise.
age a continuous control variable describing subjects’ age in years.
84 is in the middle of the distribution (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).
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wage a continuous control variable describing subjects’ wage in euros.
Table 3 below summarizes the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our
analysis. The subject pool was comprised of 55% females and 35% university stu-
dents. About 37% of the subjects did not work at all, 18% worked in a low-level job
and the remaining 45% had a medium or high-level job. The variable wage refers to
the 171 subjects who currently have a job.
Note that one subject did not answer the questionnaire at all. Our sample is
therefore restricted to 269 self-reported observations.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Median Mode Std. Dev Min Max
obesity 269 4.18 4 4 1.05 1 7
dobese 269 0.33 0 0 0.47 0 1
dthin 269 0.20 0 0 0.40 0 1
beauty 269 4.79 5 5 0.97 1 7
ambition 269 4.52 5 5 1.34 1 7
self-est. 269 4.49 5 5 1.48 1 7
female 270 0.55 1 1 0.50 0 1
age 270 29.33 25 24 9.47 18 65
wage 171 1316 700 1500 848 100 7000
One can make the following observations from Table 3. The mean, the median and
the mode of the variables beauty, ambition and self − esteem are much higher than
expected. Although the median value is 4, subjects overestimate their characteristics.
However, in regard to obesity the mean value approaches the expected one, while
the mode and the median are exactly 4.
Finally it is necessary to check whether our measure of obesity correlates with
BMI. We have we run an additional experiment with 658 students where we asked
then to fill the same questionnaire and also height/weight (see Bosch-Dome`nech et al.
2014). The results are highly significant: robese,BMI = 0.505 (p = 0.000) for females
and robese,BMI = 0.466 (p = 0.000) for males. We clearly see that self-reported
perceived obesity is highly correlated with self-reported BMI.
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4 Results
First we will look at the relationship between the amount of money asked by the
participants and their self-reported level of obesity. Following this we perform a
probit regression analysis which allows us to control for other factors that may impact
the dependent variables (such as, beauty, gender and other socioeconomic variables).
4.1 Preliminary results
We look at the relation between the dependent variable money(.) and the explanatory
variable obesity9. Figure 1 shows the average amount of money requested according
to the different (self-reported) levels of obesity. The size of the bubble in the figure is
proportional to the number of people belonging to each level of obesity. The number
written in each bubble gives the number of subjects in each group.
At first glance there does not appear to be a clear trend between the two variables.
However, looking only at obesity levels of 4-7, a clear negative trend can be seen. This
leads us to the following observation: The more obese individuals perceive themselves
to be, the less money they request on average. This is supported by the nonparametric
tests (Cuzick and Mann-Whitney). The requests made by individuals at level 4, and
at levels 5 and 6, are significant and negative10. On the other hand, there is no clear
pattern for the average requests among the people who feel thin (level 1-3). These
two observations support our argument that the variable obesity could actually be
analyzed better if it is disentangled into two distinct variables, dobese and dthin.
4.2 Regression analysis
In the regression analysis we control for personal, and socio economic, characteristics
and for the influence of monitors on the subjects’ answers. The personal character-
istics we control for are, beauty, personality characteristics such as ambition and
self − esteem, and the socioeconomic variables of age and wage.
To control for the presence of the monitors is important as the interviews were
conducted by them without supervision11. Consequently, we allow for intra− group
9Without controlling for other socio-demographic variables that might affect the dependent
variable
10Cuzick test (comparing all medians): z = 1.96 (p = 0.051), Mann-Whitney test (comparing
obesity=4 with obesity=5): z = 2.28 (p = 0.020), Mann-Whitney test (comparing obesity=4 with
obesity=6): z = 2.24 (p = 0.020).
11Although they were specifically instructed not to influence subjects’ answers, we cannot ignore
that subjects may have been recruited from the interviewer’s proximate environment. A Kruskal-
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Figure 1: Average money requested by obesity level. Legend: The size of the
bubble is proportional to the number of individuals in that category. The number within
represents the exact number of individuals. The Y-axis shows the average money(.) re-
quested in each category.
correlation and relax the usual requirement that the observations be independent.
That is, the observations are independent across groups (27 clusters for different
monitors), but not necessarily within groups. This kind of analysis affects the stan-
dard errors and variance-covariance matrix of the estimators, but not the estimated
coeffcients.
Table 4 reports the coefficients and the standard errors (in parenthesis) for a
series of regressions with the aforementioned cluster specification:
• two ordered probit regressions –columns 1(a) and 1(b)– on the dependent vari-
able money(.) and,
• two probit regressions –columns 2(a) and 2(b)– on the binary variable money(1/0).
Wallis test on the variable money(.) for significant differences among groups of people dealing with
different mediators confirms this claim (p < 0.001).
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Table 4
Probit Regressions
Variable money(.) money(1/0)
1(a) 1(b) 2(a) 2(b)
APPEARANCE
obesity −.109+ -.054
(.063) (.077)
dobese -.422** -.340*
(.124) (.150)
dthin -.230 -.347
(.212) (.253)
beauty .087 .073 .125+ .110
(.077) (.347) (.077) (.081)
PERSONALITY
ambition .095 .098 .061 .060
(.063) (.063) (.073) (.073)
self-est. .025 .027 .041 .042
(.060) (.060) (.065) (.065)
SOCIOECON
female -.003 .000 .044 .055
(.167) (.170) (.200) (.200)
age -.129* -.128* -.134* -.133*
(.059) (.057) (.062) (.060)
age2 .001+ .001+ .001+ .001+
(.001) (.0007) (.001) (.0007)
wage -.000 -.000 −.0001+ −.0002+
(.0001) (.000) (.0001) (.0001)
constant 2.042+ 2.06+
(1.128) (1.107)
N 269 269 269 269
Pr > chi2 0.001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0001
Notes: Standard errors (adjusted for 27 clusters in interviewers) of pa-
rameter estimates in parentheses. +p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
The difference between regressions of type (a) and (b) is that while the original
7-level obesity is used in the first one as the main explanatory variable, the dummies
dobese and dthin are engaged in the second ones in order to disentangle the effect. We
control for the continuous variables age, age2 and wage and for the ordinal variables
13
beauty, ambition and self − esteem in all the regressions. No multicollinearity
problem was observed in our regression models.12.
Regressions 1(a) and 2(a) confirm the negative association of the dependent
variables –money(.) and money(> 0)– with obesity. However the association is
marginally significant. When disentangling obesity in regressions 1(b) and 2(b), we
find that the variable dobese is negatively associated (1% and 5% significant level,
respectively) in both models, while dthin is not. Therefore, the negative sign of 1(a)
and 2(a) is due to the lower requests by obese subjects (level 5, 6 and 7), rather than
the higher requests of thin subjects. The results are summarized below.
Result 1: In comparison to ”non-obese”, (i) ”obese” subjects request significantly less
money and (ii) are more prone not to request any money at all.
In other words, when free to state the amount they would like to accept for com-
pleting the survey, ”obese” individuals ask for a significantly less amount compared
to ”non-obese” individuals.
No clear cut results are obtained when we study the self reported measure of
beauty with the corresponding dependent variables of models 1(a) to 2(b). We do
not find any significant association between beauty and requested money at any
reasonable significance levels13.
The following general remarks can be made for the rest of the variables used as
controls in the regression: i) Age is negatively associated with the dependent variable
in regressions 1(a) to 2(b) ii) Though we conjectured that self − esteem may re-
enforce self discrimination, we do not find it to be significant in any regression; iv)
Finally, wage shows a marginal effect.
Now we look at gender effects. Figure 2 gives a very good representation of this
result by illustrating the average money requests by obesity level and gender.
Althought we did not find the variable female significant in any of the regres-
sions (with or without controls), figure 2 suggests a negative trend. This is also
corroborated by a series of non-parametric analysis14. Figure 2 clearly shows that
the negative trend between money requests and obesity (or dobese) is confirmed only
in the female subsample.
12In addition to the above illustrated models, we repeated the whole set of regressions using the
continuos variable money (the original variable) tobit regression methods. The results are very
similar to those obtained from the ordered probit model (1(a) and 1(b)). The results are identical
in terms of significance in the case of the main variable, obesity.
13The only exception is regression 2(a) in which beauty is weakly (10%) and positively associated
with money(1/0), that is, those who consider themselves ”good-looking” are more likely to ask for
money.
14Available upon request.
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Figure 2: Average money requested by obesity level: Gender differences.
Legend: Light bubbles correspond to females and dark ones refer to males. The size of the
bubble is proportional to the number of individuals in that category. The number within
each bubble represents the exact number of individuals. Y-axis shows the average amount
of money(.) requested in each category.
Table 5 repeats the analysis done in Table 4 for the sample of females and males
separately. One can clearly see that females that self report to be obese (level 5, 6
and 7) request significantly less money than non-obese females (level 4).
Comparing the results of Table 5 with the corresponding results in Table 4, we
see that obesity is negatively and significantly associated with money requests only
for the female subsample. Result 2 summarizes our results.
Result 2: The negative association between money(.) and money(1/0) and dobese is
mainly due to female participation in the sample.
In other words, females who perceive themselves as obese request significantly
less money compared to females who perceive themselves as neither obese nor thin.
This effect does not appear for males.
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Table 5
Probit Regressions by Gender
Variable money(.) money(1/0)
1(a) 1(b) 2(a) 2(b)
Fem. Male Fem. Male Fem. Male Fem. Male
APPEARANCE
obesity -.117 -.093 -.044 -.064
(.094) (.096) (.114) (.140)
dobese -.685** -.163 -.624* -.111
(.208) (.193) (.266) (.225)
dthin -.415 -.059 -.566 -.192
(.315) (.273) (.341) (.360)
beauty .077 .130 .068 .121 .102 .250+ .089 .241+
(.106) (.131) (.102) (.132) (.109) (.134) (.105) (.136)
PERSONALITY
ambition .089 .091 .094 .090 .077 -.031 .081 -.036
(.080) (.106) (.081) (.107) (.095) (.123) (.098) (.123)
self-est. .006 .045 -.017 .050 -.038 .189+ -.071 .196+
(.084) (.095) (0.83) (.099) (.084) (.110) (.081) (.116)
SOCIOECON
age -.088 -.192** -.077 -.196** -.076 -.228** -.061 -.235**
(.070) (.076) (.063) (.077) (.080) (.076) (.073) (.080)
age2 .001 .002* .001 .002* .001 .002** .001 .003**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
wage -.000 -.000 -.000 .000 -.0001 -.0001 -.0002 -.0002
(.0001) (.0001) (.000) (.000) (.0001) (.0001)(.0001) (.0001)
constant 1.321 2.959* 1.42 2.951+
(1.558) (1.509)(1.408) (1.665)
N 148 121 148 121 148 121 148 121
Pr > chi2 .057 0.002 .0500 0.00 .0805 0.000 .000 0.0001
Notes: Standard errors (adjusted for 27 clusters in interviewers) of parameter
estimates in parentheses. +p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
5 Self-reported vs. monitor data
In the absence of any objective measure of obesity, it is important to check the discrepancy
between self, and monitor, reported obesity. In Figure 3 we compare both measures. To
facilitate a visual comparison we merge obesity levels 1, 2 and 3 into the thin category and
levels 5, 6 and 7 into the obese category. Figure 3 shows that for each category the fraction
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of people who report below (self-report<monitor’s report), match (self-report=monitor’s
report) or above (self-report>monitor’s report) their own obesity level relative to the mon-
itor’s evaluation.
Figure 3: Subject’s reports compare to monitor’s reports. Legend: sr stands
for self-reported obesity; mr stands for monitor reported obesity. The category ”thin”
merge all the subjects with sr < 4 while the ”obese” category refers to those with sr >
4. For each category its shown the percentage of people who underestimate (sr < mr),
accurately-estimate (sr = mr) or overestimate (sr > mr) their own self-reported obesity
level compared to the monitors’ reported evaluation.
Interestingly, the percentage of individuals who report above the monitors evaluation
in the obese category (62%) is significantly15 higher than those who report below (42%)
or match (44%) the monitors evaluation (p = 0.028 and p = 0.010 respectively). Hence,
among the obese group, there is a larger fraction of subjects who consider themselves
more obese than the monitor’s evaluation. As an additional robustness check, we repeat
the regressions of Table 4 using the monitor reported obesity variables (instead of the
self-reported measurements) and we find no significant effect. This indicates that money
requests by subjects are only affected by their own perception regarding their obesity level.
Now we combine self-reported and monitor information in the same regressions. In
Table 6, we repeat type-b (where the dummy variable dobese is used instead of the ordinal
variable obesity) regressions on money(.) and money(1/0) by including two new variables:
over an ordinal variable [0, 5] indicating the magnitude of over-statement of self-reports
15In order to perform the test, we use the binary variable overestimation which takes value = 1
if self − report > monitor′s report and = 0 otherwise.
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relative to monitors’ reports on obesity: over = self -report − monitor′s only if
over > 0 and 0 otherwise.16
overob captures the interaction between dobese and over, that is, selects subjects who con-
sider themselves obese and overstate (relative to what was stated by the monitors).
Table 6
Probit Regressions by Gender including Obesity overestimation
Variable money(.) money(1/0)
1(c) 1(d) 2(c) 2(d)
Fem Male Fem Male Fem Male Fem Male
dobese -.698* -.107 -.310 −.372+-.696** -.025 -.070 -.367
(.202) (.190) (.292) (.221) (.263) (.230) (.332) (.330)
over .069 .169 .228* -.336* .177 -.293* .569** -.490**
(.084) (.107) (.103) (.164) (.127) (.116) (.190) (.172)
overob -.408* .321 -.760** .391
(.192) (.241) (.287) (.266)
N 147 121 147 121 147 121 147 121
Pr > chi2 .000 .0052 .0000 .0014 .0006 .0000 .0025 .0000
Notes: Standard errors (adjusted for 27 clusters in interviewers) of
parameter estimates in parentheses. +p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
Table 6 provides new insights to our discussion. We first look at the regressions that
refer to the subsample of females.
In the female subsample, when regressing money(.) or money(1/0) the inclusion of
the interaction term overob has a definitive impact:
• The variable over is positively and significantly associated to both money(.) and
money(1/0) (5% and 1% respectively). This implies that (monitor reported) thin
women who overestimate their own obesity level and self-report as normal (control
group, obese=4) request for more money. In words, thin females who see themselves
normal claim more money.
• The sum of the coeffcients of dobese + overob is negative and significant at the 1%
level (Wald test) for all positive overestimation levels but not for over = 0 in both
1(d) and 2(d) regressions. This means that the negative effect of obesity on money
requests is true only for those females who overestimate their obesity levels. Hence
only those women who overstimate claim less money.
16We also considered another alternative specification of over including the negative values. Re-
sults are less robust but consistent with the results showed along this section.
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We therefore conclude,
Result 3: The more an obese female overstates her own obesity level the more severe is the
negative effect on her money requests.
In the male subsample everything is different. The variable over is always negative
and significant (at 5% and 1% respectively) when the interaction term, overob, is included
in the regressions. This means that the more a self-reported normal male overestimates
his own obesity17 level the less money he requests. However, when the interaction term is
not included in the regression, the variable over is negative and significant (at 5% level)
only for money(1/0), indicating that males (of all obesity levels) who overestimate their
obesity level are less likely to request any money.
Result 4: Males who overstates their own obesity level, regarless of their objetive size, are
willing to accept less money.
Concluding, we find that the two dimensions of obesity: ”objective” -reported by
monitors- and ”subjective” -self-reported- have an additional impact on money requests
which is asymmetric for females and males.
6 Conclusions
The main conclusion of the present study is that self-reported obese individuals, and espe-
cially females who overstate their obesity levels, demand less or nothing when faced with
the opportunity to earn a certain amount of money. We think that this result contributes
towards explaining the well-established wage gap for obese individuals. Our results sug-
gest that this could be another channel by which the wage gap for self perceived obese
individuals is exacerbated.
Moreover, our experimental results show that the negative association between obesity
and money is stronger among females. This result is supported by many socio-psychological
studies on attractiveness (Zebrowitz 1997, Hatfield and Sprecher 1986). Interestingly, it is
only self-perception that matters. The negative effect of obesity effect is not confirmed, for
females or males, when using monitor reported estimation of subjects’ obesity. Moreover,
although monitor reports on obesity are not significant for money requests, its difference
with subjects’ self-reported levels is shown to have an impact on subject behavior. The
more a female overstates her obesity level the stronger is the negative effect of obesity on
her money requests. As regards the behavior of non-obese and normal − thin subjects
(self-reported normal, thin according to their monitors) is concerned, the effect of over
stating obesity is asymmetric across gender: female normal − thins request more, while
17If a self-reported normal male overestimates it is because he is thin for the monitor
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male normal − thins request less compared with individuals who do not overstate their
obesity level.
A possible explanation for this gender specific result may be the different appearance
characteristics influencing males and females. A self-reported normal male, who is seen
by others as thin, would probably feel ”weak” when confronted with the masculinity ideal
while a normal−thin female would probably feel ”pretty” when exempted from the weight
restrictions imposed by the beauty ideal. Following the reasoning of the self-fulfilling
prophecy theory, a male perceived and treated as thin-weak should develop an inferiority
complex while a female perceived and treated as thin-pretty would react in the opposite
manner.
Such a generalization of course has its limitations. As with the vast body of exper-
imental studies, standard criticisms of the representativeness of our subject pool apply.
Furthermore, monitor influence on subject answers could only be controlled statistically.
Another important caveat is that we model a one-shot interaction between subjects and
monitors while in real life the salary negotiation process may last for longer, leaving time
for both employers and candidates to readjust their strategies. Regardless, our results es-
tablish that self perception of ones physical appearance biases money requests downwards
and the effect is stronger for females who perceived themselves as being obese.
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